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Can We Be Both Moral Relativists and Moral? 
 
Occasions arise where some behaviour that would be deemed immoral when occurring in 
one culture is justified by pointing out that it is happening in another culture which regards it 
as at least morally acceptable. Some form of cultural moral relativism is cited, and the claim 
is made that judging it ‘from without’ is ‘cultural imperialism’. 
 
I will consider how we might set about comparing moral codes between societies and review 
some empirical work that suggests descriptive moral relativism may well be incorrect.  I will 
then suggest that moral phenomenology contains a normative experience of an obligation as 
an external demand.  I argue for the claim that any relativist or non-realist metaethics is 
inconsistent with moral phenomenology and that normativity is incompatible with moral 
relativism.  I shall also argue that relativism degenerates into moral solipsism.  Finally I then 
suggest that we should look towards a variety of pragmatism to justify the practice of moral 
dialogue. 
 
The article on ‘Moral Relativism’ in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy1 offers two 
characterisations of moral relativism: 
 
“Descriptive Moral Relativism (DMR). As a matter of empirical fact, there are deep 
and widespread moral disagreements across different societies, and these 
disagreements are much more significant than whatever agreements there may 
be.” 
 
(This would contrast with the claim that although there may be apparent moral 
disagreements, they are largely different realisations of what are the same moral values 
when viewed at a sufficiently fundamental level.) 
 
“Metaethical Moral Relativism (MMR). The truth or falsity of moral judgments, or 
their justification, is not absolute or universal, but is relative to the traditions, 
convictions, or practices of a group of persons.” 
 
The first characterisation is the kind of moral relativism that is of interest to, say, 
anthropologists when studying societies and cultures. The claim may or may not be true, but 
its status as an empirical claim seems, at first sight, to be uncontentious.  It is a statement 
about the existence of differences between societies, not about the truth, or otherwise, of 
moral judgements made in those societies. 
 
The second characterisation is the kind of moral relativism that interests moral philosophers, 
and is very much about the truth, assertability, justification, and so on, of moral claims made 
within societies.  It is also the kind of moral relativism that is at stake in the many disputes 




1 (Gowans, Chris, "Moral Relativism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2019 Edition), Edward 
N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/moral-relativism/>.) 
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But the first characterisation (DMR) is not without its philosophical problems and I first intend 
to say something about it if only because some such assumption is often made when 
discussing the second.  So I’d like first to identify on two questions: (1) how do we identify 
what counts as ‘moral’ in a particular culture or society? and (2) what counts as a culture or 
a society?  I’ll then return to the second characterisation (MMR) and to the coherence of such 
a position. 
 
I will start with question (1). 
How in general do we set about marking out the domain of ‘the moral’?  How do we go about 
identifying the domain of ‘the moral’ in different cultures or societies in order to compare 
them? 
Let us for a moment take it that societies all have ‘standards of conduct’ and that some of 
these are ‘moral’ in nature.  Are the ‘moral’ standards ‘moral’ in virtue of their form or their 
content?  
 
By ‘form’ I mean: are moral standards moral not simply in virtue of what they are about, but 
in virtue of the stance that we take towards them?  For example, they place certain demands 
on us, they override other considerations, they occupy a central regulative role in society. 
 
Or are ‘moral’ standards ‘moral’ in virtue of what they are about, that is, in having certain 
content, or subject matter?  That is, morality is characterised by (elements of) its content. 
 
It is possible that the two characterisations pick out different kinds of standards of conduct. 
If morality is characterised by its form, its regulatory role, it may, for example, include 
behavioural codes that we would more naturally describe as religious or ritualistic. However, 
if morality is characterised by content, for a society’s standards of conduct to be moral 
standards they must be consistent with that content. (It may be a ‘basic’ content that 
underlies differing realisations – the same basic content may be treated in different ways.) 
 
The latter approach, however, immediately renders descriptive moral relativism false. 
Demarcating the ‘moral’ by its content would mean that in essence the same content would 
be picked out, should it be present, in the societies being compared and hence the essence 
of morality, if present, would be the same in those different societies.  We would be reduced 
to asking: to what extent do other cultures have a moral code? – the question being answered 
by reference to what we take to be the content of a moral code.  This rules out moral 
relativism. 
This leaves us with morality as form or structure, in its being regulative, conduct-guiding, in a 
particular way. If we are demarcating morality descriptively in different cultures, then this 
option seems the most natural approach. We will not be making prior judgements on content, 
or on the religious or ritual nature of the codes.   
We can look at discourses and practices in different cultures and identify those that exhibit 
the structural and attitudinal features that we think are common to moral practices; typically, 
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those that are appropriately authoritative and directive; those which invoke attitudes of 
approval and disapproval, those that have social sanctions against them, and so on. 
Once we have identified the moral domains in different cultures, we can then go on to 
determine whether the function and content of the moralities identified have commonalities. 
Anthropologists at Oxford University recently undertook such an exercise of the sort I have 
been describing.  The researchers claim2 to have:  
“… discovered what they believe to be seven universal moral rules.  The rules: help 
your family, help your group, return favours, be brave, defer to superiors, divide 
resources fairly, and respect others’ property were found in a survey of 60 cultures 
from all around the world.” (Oxford 2019) 
“… People everywhere face a similar set of problems, and use a similar set of moral 
rules to solve them. As predicted, these seven moral rules appear to be universal 
across cultures.  Everyone everywhere shares a common moral code. All agree that 
cooperating, promoting the common good, is the right thing to do.” (Oxford 2019) 
“The research found, first, that these seven cooperative behaviours were always 
considered morally good. Second, examples of most of these morals were found in 
most societies. Crucially, there were no counter-examples – no societies in which any 
of these behaviours were considered morally bad.  And third, these morals were 
observed with equal frequency across continents; they were not the exclusive 
preserve of ‘the West’ or any other region.” (Oxford 2019) 
“The study also detected ‘variation on a theme’ – although all societies seemed to 
agree on the seven basic moral rules, they varied in how they prioritised or ranked 
them.” (Oxford 2019) 
I want to bring out two points from this account.  
§ The researchers must have come up with a way to distinguish moral codes and practices 
from other codes and practices in order to carry out cross-cultural comparisons. 
 
§ This method of distinguishing moral practices cannot include any substantial moral 
content because it is the content in different cultures that they wish to compare. 
We are working with the assumption that morality is a complex set of practices which has 
particular structural, conduct-guiding features.  In the ‘Oxford’ research, to determine 
whether their predicted moral content is actually part of the morality in a culture they looked 
to see whether it is presented in an appropriate way within that culture as recorded in 
ethnographic accounts; whether it is directive in the right way.  
“Having identified instances of the cooperative behaviors of interest, the next task 
was to determine whether they were presented in a morally valenced way, and if so 
 
2 (Oxford 2019)  http://www.ox.ac.uk/news/2019-02-11-seven-moral-rules-found-all-around-world 
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whether the valence was positive or negative. Thus the code book instructed coders 
to record whether the behavior was described as good, right, moral, ethical, or 
virtuous, or as an obligation, duty, or moral norm, and so on. It could also be indicated 
by morally valenced words. For example, the mere mention of “family loyalty” or 
“property rights” would suffice to indicate the presence of a positive moral valence.” 
(Oxford 2019) 
Does the Oxford study make a case against descriptive moral relativism?   It seems to have 
sought to take a set of behaviours, ‘morality as cooperation’, and investigated whether 
instances of cooperative behaviours formed part of the moral practices of a wide variety of 
societies. But if this is what was done, it does not seem to identify whether they are a core 
element of the moralities of these different societies.  They form a component, but how 
significant a component is undetermined.  Looking at it another way, each of the various 
moral codes could have included different significant practices not looked for and 
incompatible with each other. 
If this is how the study was conducted, it theoretically leaves the question of descriptive moral 
relativism unresolved.  However, it does offer evidence of some similarity between moralities 
in a wide range of different societies.  Insofar as the similarity is between basic elements of 
the moral codes, this weakens any case for metaethical moral relativism that uses descriptive 
moral relativism as support. 
We have already drawn a distinction between descriptive and metaethical moral relativism. 
Before considering the metaethical version, I want to consider normative moral relativism. 
Descriptive relativism claims that moral codes vary from culture to culture – they are relative 
to their culture.  Normative relativism is more difficult to state.  It is something like the view 
that, at least, we ought to tolerate other cultures’ moral codes, or, perhaps, that we ought to 
tolerate the actions of those in any culture where they conform to the moral code of that 
culture. 
 
The problem then arises for locating the (presumably moral) ‘ought’ of compliance or 
toleration, if moral ‘oughts’ only hold relative to a culture.  Does the obligation to toleration 
exist relative to our culture, other cultures, or some all-encompassing culture? The 
requirements of normative relativism look suspiciously like absolute moral requirements 
unless we do not demand reciprocal toleration between cultures but only toleration within 
our culture of other cultures. 
 
How does normative relativism relate to metaethical relativism?  Metaethical relativism gives 
rise to normative relativism because it claims that moral principles will be true, or assertable, 
or justified relative to one’s culture, and presumably one ought to follow principles that are 
true, assertible or justified. However, if metaethical relativism is incorrect, and assuming that 
there are moral principles, then the truth, assertability or justification is independent of 
culture and hence normative relativism cannot be correct. 
 
I want now to consider the phenomenology of morality.  I intend to claim that the 
phenomenology of morality is incompatible with moral relativism. My argument will exploit 
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‘the unresolvable tension’ as Mark Jenkins3 elegantly expresses it, there is ‘between ethical 
conviction and contingency’ (2006, p186). 
 
Horgan and Timmons4 give a description of moral phenomenology (based on Mandelbaum5).  
Three main features of experiences of direct moral obligation are identified, and I wish to 
concentrate on the first two  
 
“… main features: 
1. “They are ought-judgment involving: an agent having or under- going such an 
experience judges of herself that in the present circumstances she ought or ought 
not perform some action.  
2. “This ought-judgment is part of an overall moral experience in which one 
experiences a felt demand whose elements include (a) a feeling of pressure, (b) a 
sense of a vector-like force which has an “external” origin and is directed at 
oneself, and (c) an associated motivational pull toward either performing an action 
or refraining from performing an action.” (Horgan & Timmons (2008), p288) 
I would add an additional feature: 
• The ought-judgement is seen to be categorical.  It is not dependent upon other goals, 
nor does it seem to us to be contingent upon our personal history or current 
circumstances (although our recognising the judgement, might be). 
Horgan and Timmons claim that: 
“… there is one metaethical position, “cognitivist expressivism,” that (a) seems very 
promising in its capacity to accommodate the facts of moral phenomenology (without 
overlooking or distorting the facts in question) but (b) denies that moral judgments 
are robustly objective.” (Horgan & Timmons (2008), p290) 
But I suggest that the problem is not so much whether there is an ethical theory that can 
describe or explain why we have the outlined phenomenology without invoking robust 
objectivism, but rather whether, psychologically, our phenomenological experience can 
withstand acceptance of such a theory; whether the moral demand can remain unaffected.  
If we accept ‘cognitive expressivism’ then this explains our (mistaken) view that moral 
judgements are objective.  The question is then: can we then continue to experience them as 
‘felt demands’ as we did before?  To which I think the answer is: no, or only at the price of 
cognitive dissonance.   Our metaethics and normative ethical experience need to be 
consistent.  Otherwise our moral phenomenology has been ‘debunked’ by our metaethics. 
 
The suggestion is that moral claims seem to present themselves phenomenologically as 
requirements over and against our inclinations and wishes. They seem to arise as external 
 
3 Mark Jenkins, Bernard Williams (Chesham: Acumen, 2006) 
4 Horgan and Timmons, ‘What does Moral Phenomenology tell us about Moral Objectivity?’, in Social 
Philosophy & Policy Foundation, USA, 2008) 
5 Maurice Mandelbaum ‘The Phenomenology of Moral Experience (Glencoe, IL: The New Press, 1955) 
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demands to which we are called to conform. If we take this at face value, then it becomes 
hard to regard them simultaneously as somehow arising either from our own motivations, 
however moderated, or simply from societal norms.   
 
If we agree with the characterisation of moral phenomenology given here, any forms of 
expressivism, fictionalism, and so on, seem at root to be just varieties of nihilism. 
 
We can, I suppose, continue with some form of near moral relativism if we think that there is 
one absolute moral requirement, that of cultural tolerance – the moral judgements in 
different cultures are to be respected.  But why is this particular requirement the best 
candidate for an absolute moral requirement? 
 
It may be that our phenomenological experience can be accommodated in a moral theory 
that does not posit moral absolutism.  Indeed, as mentioned earlier, Horgan and Timmons 
claim that the objective phenomenology of morality is consistent with their ‘cognitivist 
expressivism’.  However, I am not convinced that the objective phenomenology of morality is 
consistent with our believing in cognitivist expressivism.  This point is closely related to 
Mackie’s thought6 that although morality is an ‘error’, it “might be thought dangerous, and in 
any case unnecessary, to expose it as a fiction. It is disputable.” (1977, p239).  Morality, in its 
overriding, obligatory form, only works if we think it true in some sense.  It loses its obligatory 
nature if we take it as at bottom a feeling, a belief about a feeling, or a convention. 
 
The upshot of my argument so far is that moral relativism is inconsistent with the kind of 
normativity that we usually take morality to have – a demand, or sense of overriding 
obligation. 
 
I will now argue further that moral relativism does not allow moral claims to be normatively 
demanding.  I have derived my argument in this section from a more sophisticated argument 
of Paul Boghossian7. 
 
At its simplest, the argument is that the statement ‘this is (morally) wrong’ is a normative 
claim, but once a relational qualification is added – say, ‘this is wrong in this culture’ or even 
“’this is wrong’ is true in this culture”, the normative import is lost and it becomes a 
descriptive claim.  To be told ‘killing is wrong’ is to be normatively directed – ‘don’t kill’; to be 
told ‘killing is wrong in France’ is a descriptive claim about moral codes in France.  Insofar as 
there could be said to be any directive element to this it would perhaps be ‘when in France, 
don’t kill’, which at best would be a pragmatic recommendation, or perhaps an indication of 
what would be good manners. 
 
These considerations lead us to the conclusion that moral claims cannot be relativised 
without losing their normativity.  Hence metaethical moral relativism and normative 
relativism are problematic positions to hold.  But the phenomenology of an ‘external demand’ 
 
6 J. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, 1977, Harmondsworth: Penguin 
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is also difficult to support if morality is seen either as arising internally in an agent or being a 
consequence of some sort of convention.  The lack of truth, assertability or justification of 
moral claims mean that they cannot present an external demand as required by moral 
phenomenology. If we take the phenomenology as an essential feature of morality we are 
seemingly presented with a choice: either moral non-relativism (absolutism) or moral 
nihilism. I assume here, without argument, that many find both options unpalatable. 
 
Moral requirements can only function normatively if we have confidence that they are 
objective requirements.  Our observations that different cultures, or even different 
individuals, claim to have different moral requirements does not logically require us to give 
up our belief that we are obligated to adhere to what we perceive as morally required.  Others 
may just be wrong.  Nevertheless, it cannot be emphasised strongly enough that a belief that 
morality is absolute certainly does not entail that it is the moral code of one’s own culture 
that is correct. 
However, awareness of the existence of other, different, codes of morality can have a 
weakening effect psychologically.  As Christopher Hamilton8 writes: “It is, I think, simply too 
late in the day to flee the tragic acknowledgement that our values, even though we are 
committed to them, are contingent and could have been otherwise.” (2016, p138) 
I suggest that if we take the view that our moral values are those we just happen to have, 
contingently, then however strongly we hold them, our commitment to them is thereby 
weakened and our moral confidence diminished. 
A society (call it society A) may or may not have a moral code with universalising tendencies.  
If it does, then it may make claims on behalf of, or against, members of another society, B.  
The fact that society B’s moral codes are in disagreement with society A’s does not logically 
require members of society A to be indifferent about the conditions of members of society B. 
The attribution of blame may be affected, however.  Although Society A may hold that actions 
deemed to be morally acceptable in society B are morally wrong, it may seem inappropriate 
to blame members of society B effectively simply for having been raised in society B.  
However, as alluded to earlier, anyone making cross-cultural moral judgements needs to do 
so with modesty and care.  There can be no unthinking presumption of correctness and no 
assumption of moral superiority. 
I have been talking about societies and cultures.  At the beginning I put the question of what 
counts as a culture or society on hold.  I have not answered this, and I’d like to return to it, 
but only to suggest that there is no need to answer it. No culture or society exhibits total 
uniformity of moral belief, and all have porous boundaries (even North Korea).  So where to 
draw the line? Why not between different identities? But what about intersectionality?  Then 
why not round each individual? If so, moral truth is what is true for me.  
 
 
8 C. Hamilton, A Philosophy of Tragedy, London: Reaktion Books, 2016 
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There have been attempts to address the problem of moral relativism by using an indexed 
notion of truth.  These approaches suggest that in the claim “‘this is wrong’ is true”, ‘true’ is 
indexed to the speaker, in a similar way to the claim “‘I am here’ is true” is indexed to the 
speaker’s spatial and temporal location. 
 
My moral judgements are correct because I am the measure of morality.  I am, we might say, 
a moral solipsist. But then there can be no disagreement because there is nothing to disagree 
about.  If something is true for me, and it is not true for you, there is no conflict, only different 
truths. 
 
So finally, do these discussions lead us to lose confidence in our moral values and have our 
convictions weakened?  Do we water down our notion of morality and perhaps assimilate 
moral judgements to (strongly held) opinions on matters of taste?  I have already given some 
reasons why moral relativism may not be a coherent position.  For many, moral nihilism is 
unappetising, if not unachievable in practice. So before giving in too readily, let us see 
whether we can perhaps find an alternative. 
  
Moral solipsism is not an option.  Given that we do have moral commitments, many involving 
the lives of others, we will want, and need, to argue with them and persuade them of our 
views.  Morality is essentially a public, not a private, business.  And I suggest that aiming at 
truth is constitutive of argument.  What is going on when we cite evidence, marshal rational 
arguments and so on except an attempt to justify our opinion and show that it is correct?  
(There is an alternative view, that what is going on is a power struggle, an attempt at 
dominance, or, perhaps, ‘mere’ rhetoric – without the logos and ethos and ending up in some 
kind of satisfying or therapeutic pathos. Truth is not at stake. But if so, how can one argue for 
this view? What is the status of this claim – is it true?) 
 
Maybe we can learn something from pragmatists such as Huw Price.  Price9 makes a far more 
sophisticated pragmatic case for the indispensability of the notion of truth than I offer here 
(even if such a notion is a fiction).  He suggests that it is best for a pragmatist to ask 
explanatory questions about truth: “Why do we have such a notion? What job does it do in 
language? What features does it need to have to play this role? And how would things be 
different if we didn’t have it?” (Price 2003, p175) 
 
Price claims that 
 
“... [i]f we did not have a normative notion in addition to the norms of subjective 
assertibility and personal warranted assertibility, the idea that we might improve our 
commitments by seeking to align them with those of our community would be simply 
incoherent.” (Price 2003, p175) 
 
This normative notion “not only creates the conceptual space for argument … but actively 
encourages speakers to participate.” (Price 2003, p175) 
 
He goes on to suggest that 
 
9 Huw Price, ‘Truth as Convenient Friction’ in The Journal of Philosophy, Vol 100, No 4, Apr., 2003, pp167-190 
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“[w]ithout truth, the wheels of argument do not engage; disagreements slide past one 
another. This is true of disagreements about any matter whatsoever. … If we didn’t 
already have truth … we could be aware that we have different opinions about what 
is warrantedly assertible, without that difference of opinion seeming to matter. … The 
crucial point is … that assertoric dialogue requires an intolerance of disagreement.” 
(Price 2003, pp185-186) 
 
But where does this view on truth leave us?  It suggests that without a normative notion of 
truth there is little prospect of any meaningful discussion of moral issues. In the end it makes 
little practical difference whether we think there are objective moral truths or whether we 
adopt this pragmatic approach, because even if there are objective moral truths we would 
still have to find out what those objective truths are.  And how else could we discover them 
but by discussing, arguing and reasoning, and, just possibly, by agreeing? 
 
So, in conclusion, the pragmatic approach requires, first, that moral judgements are to be 
discussed and argued over, and improvement and agreement sought.  But second, it also 
requires that even if we are sceptical of the notion of (capital T) Truth, if we want to argue 
about morality and improve our judgements, we must reason as if there is a truth to be found.  
Not truth relative to our culture or to our society, or truth for me; just truth.  
 
 
